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THE idea of enterprise liability is not new, even though some ob-
servers today may regard its more recent version-product liability-
as both new, and perhaps a trifle socialistic. And, certainly, as judicial
legislation! Of course, it is true that to have taken the manufacturer
from non-liability to strict liability, all in but a century, has been "no
small step."'
How this came about has been well told elsewhere2 and will not
be repeated here; rather, it is proposed to examine the development
in context with other examples of enterprise liability. In so doing,
some of the apparent newness will surely vanish, and as for judicial
legislation it may well be that the courts, for the most part, are to be
credited with having taken sound positions, working in the cautious
interstitial way which is their province.
3
Two Product Cases
It will serve best to start with two recent product liability cases.
Last April, in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,4 the Supreme Court
of New Jersey affirmed a trial court holding which gave the purchaser
of a defective rug a direct action for damages against the manufac-
turer, though the rug had been purchased from a dealer. Gone were
the requirements of privity of contract and of need to show strict
notice to the manufacturer. Nor was there need to talk of negligence
or of inherent danger, or even to show that the defect had caused
personal injury-matters of such concern only a few years back. It
was enough that the manufacturer had put defective merchandise
on the market and that a remote buyer could show damage.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; John
P. Wilson Professor of Law, Emeritus, The University of Chicago. The writer is grate-
ful for the assistance of William E. Horton of the Hastings Law Journal, and Charles A.
Brigham, member of the class of 1965, in helping to get this paper together.
1McPherson v. Buick Comes of Age, 4 U. Cm. L. REv. 461, 469 (1937).
2 For an excellent report: Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 69 YAiE L.J. 1099 (1960).
3 Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. Cm. L. REv. 501, 510 (1948),
has an illuminating study of the development.
444 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
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The trial court placed recovery on an "implied warranty" basis.5
In affirmance, Francis, J., said:
The manufacturer is the father -of the transaction. He makes the
article and puts it in the channels of trade for sale to the public ....
The dealer is simply a way station, a conduit on its trip from manu-
facturer to consumer .... In such situations considerations of justice
require a court to interest itself in originating causes and to apply
the principle-of implied warranty on that basis, rather than to test
its application by whether personal injury or simply loss of bargain
resulted from the breach of warranty. True, the rule of implied war-
ranty had its gestative stirrings because of the greater appeal of the
personal injury claim. But, once in existence, the field of operation
of the remedy should not be fenced in by such a factor.6
The court, however, went on to say: "It seems important to ob-
serve . . . that the manufacturer's liability may be cast in simpler
form."7 True enough, in prior cases the court had used the term "im-
plied warranty," but it was used only as "a convenient legal device
or formalism" to accomplish the purpose. Necessarily, in a develop-
ing field, courts have been proceeding "step by step in their search
for a stable principle." But now, the court said, "The quest has found
sound expression, we believe, in the doctrine of strict liability in
tort'.... and we accept it as applicable in this jurisdiction."9
Put in black letter, the court's formulation went this way: "It must
be said, therefore, that when the manufacturer presents his goods to
the public for sale he accompanies them with a representation that
they are suitable and safe for the intended use."10 As for the policy
reason, "The obligation of the manufacturer thus becomes what in
justice it ought to be-an enterprise liability, and one which should
not depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales."1
Among the cases relied on was Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc.12 There the California court gave a husband direct recovery
against a manufacturer for personal injuries caused by a defect in
one of the manufacturer's machines; plaintiffs wife had purchased
5 Relying in large part on Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960) (where recovery was given on a warranty theory), Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d
1 (1961).
6 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 59-60, 207 A.2d 305, 309 (1965).
7 Id. at 63, 207 A.2d at 311.
8 Id. at 64, 207 A.2d at 311.
9 Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312.
10 Id. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311.
11 Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 311-12.
1259 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
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the machine from a dealer and given it to him at Christmas. In reach-
ing this result-obviously there was no contract privity-Justice Tray-
nor said: "Implicit in the machine's presence on the market, however,
was a representation that it would safely do the jobs for which it was
built."1
3
Of course, this "representation" is as fictitious as is the "implied
warranty" contrived by earlier courts, and, if it should require the
proof necessary to a deceit action at common law, it also would
scarcely serve the purpose.'4 But, when Justice Traynor stated the
gist of the action, the word "representation" did not appear: "A manu-
facturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be Used without inspection for defects,
proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." 5
Which brings up the second recent case; Seely v. White Motor
Co.,'( decided by the Supreme Court of California, in June of 1965.
Plaintiff had bought a White Motor Company truck in October, 1959,
from a dealer, and over a period of eleven months it suffered from a
defect known as "galloping." In July of 1960 the truck turned over
causing damages of some 5,000 dollars, although plaintiff was not
injured. Then in September-both White and the dealer still having
failed to cure the "galloping"-plaintiff ceased his payments, the truck
was repossessed, and the buyer brought suit.
The trial court awarded recovery for money paid and profits lost
on the truck deal by finding a breach of an express warranty, but it
denied recovery for the money spent in repairing the truck after the
July accident. Perhaps contract law was stretched a little on the first
point, since Seely testified he did not rely on White's express warranty,
but, on the second, no finding was made that the truck accident was
caused by the defect. At all events, both holdings were affirmed.
Thus the case is not important here for its holding, but the dialogue
with the New Jersey court concerning whether full recovery should
have been allowed on a basis of "strict liability" in tort, rather than
warranty, is significant. Clearly plaintiff's case came within the New
Jersey formulation of strict liability. That is, defendant had presented
'3 Id. at 64, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901. (Emphasis added.)
14 1n the Santor case, Judge Francis carefully covered the point: "As we have said,
this representation is found in the law... The liability does not depend on traditional
requirements for proof of legal or equitable fraud." 44 N.J. 52, 67, 207 A.2d 305, 313
(1965).
15 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 27. Cal. Rptr. 697, 700,
377 P.2d 897, 900 (1963).
16 63 A.C. 1, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
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"his goods to the public for sale," 7 and he might therefore be said
to have accompanied them with a "representation" that they were
both "suitable and safe" for the intended use.
But the California court would not go so far. As Chief Justice
Traynor put it: "We are of the opinion, however, that it was inap-
propriate to impose liability on that basis in the Santor case, for it
would result in imposing liability without regard to what representa-
tions of quality the manufacturer made."18 In short, the manufacturer
in California may be said today to represent his product to be safe-
both as respects personal injury and property damagel--but any rep-
resentation of suitability, giving rise to an action for economic loss,
is still a matter of contract.20
Respondeat Superior
The time-tested example of enterprise liability is respondeat su-
perior. There have been a great many rationalizations. For example,
in one of the earliest cases, Jones v. Hart,2 Lord Holt said, "If the
servants of A. with his cart run against another cart, wherein is a pipe
of wine and overturns the cart and spoil the wine, an action lieth
against A."22 Why?-simply because "whoever employs another, is an-
swerable for him.... A century or more later, in Duncan v. Find-
later,24 the basis was more fully stated: "I set the whole thing in mo-
tion; and what he does being for my benefit and under my direction,
I am responsible for the consequences of doing it."25 About the same
time, in the Farwell case,2 6 Shaw, C. J., said the doctrine was one
"obviously founded on the great principle of social duty, that every
man, in the management of his own affairs, whether by himself or
17 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1965).
18 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 A.C. 1, 10, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23, 403 P.2d 145, 151
(1965).
19 The court said: "Physical injury to property is so akin to personal injury that
there is no reason for distinguishing them." Id. at 11, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24, 403 P.2d at 152.
20See also Dimoff v. Ernie Major, Inc., 55 Wash. 2d 385, 347 P.2d 1056 (1960).
The line between damage caused by a defect and that suffered because the product fails
to measure up to contract may be a difficult one to draw at times. See Spence v. Three
Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958) (direct
recovery allowed where defective cinder blocks caused wall damage).
212 Salk. 441, 90 Eng. Rep. 1255 (K.B. 1698).
22 Ibid.
23 ibid.
24 6 CI. & Fin. 894, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (H.L. 1839).
25 Id. at 910, 7 Eng. Rep. at 940.
26Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 38 Am. Dec.
339 (1842).
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by his agents or servants, shall so conduct them as not to injure an-
other."27
There are similarities, and differences, between these statements
and those of Justices Francis and Traynor in the products cases. The
striking similarity is that in each it is said liability should be imposed
on the person who set things in motion and had their direction and
control. In the one a truck or carpet, with a defect, is "put" upon the
market; in the other a cart with a servant in charge is sent out on
the road. In both, liability without fault is put upon the enterprise.
The striking difference between the two sets of rationalizations
is the failure of the product liability courts to mention gain or profit.
That the enterprise was set going "for my benefit" has long been a
major rationalization, in one version or another, 28 to explain respon-
deat superior. If the gains from an enterprise go to the proprietor,
what could be fairer-and more realistic from a hard-boiled dollars
and cents point of view-than that the losses of the venture also be
charged to him. Perhaps, though, it goes without saying, in the prod-
uct cases, that the manufacturer is engaged in a venture for gain.
A closer look is in order. When is the wrong done in the product
liability case? Surely not when the manufacturer puts out the prod-
uct, but earlier when management or some employee fabricates it
in a defective way. Thus we would seem to have a built-in or de-
layed-action tort.29 So also-to pursue the product analogy-when
management puts a truck or other contrivance in the hands of an
employee, if a third person is injured, say, because the machine was
ill-designed for the purpose or not kept in repair, there should be
liability.30 Lastly, when a manufacturer puts out a sound machine,
with a competent driver in charge, but one who has an accident, the
case is not essentially different. True, the fault then occurs at the
time of the accident, rather than at some earlier time; but surely
27 Id. at 55-56, 38 Am. Dec. at 340.
28 For example, in Hamlyn v. John Houston & Co., [1903] 1 K.B. 81, 85-86, defen-
dants' partner-who was to get trade information for the firm-bribed one of plaintiff's
clerks. Giving recovery, the court said: "the principal having delegated the performance
of a certain class of acts to the agent, it is not unjust that he, being the person who has
appointed the agent, and who will have the benefit of his efforts if successful, should bear
the risk of his exceeding his authority...." (Emphasis added.)
29 In an able and useful article: Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L.
REv. 119, 134 (1958), the writer discusses the parallel with the well-known "Squib
Case," Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Black W. 892, 96 Eng. 525 (1773).
30 Cf. Elliot v. Hall [1885] 15 Q.B.D. 315, 320, where the court said defendant was
under a duty to third persons "not to be guilty of negligence with regard to the state and
condition of the truck." Of course, this falls short of strict liability.
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that must be a superficial distinction. If so, the basic responsibility
of the enterprise would appear to be much the same in each case.
Motor Vehicle Statutes
Many states have statutes imposing liability on a motor vehicle
owner, for accidents occurring while the car is being used with his
consent.31 Liability is strict, but no more so than in the respondeat
superior cases just discussed. That is, evidence of the owner's care is
irrelevant; proof of the driver's negligence is necessary. Essentially
what these statutes do, therefore, is to broaden the "master-servant"
category; anyone-son, wife, friend, employee-if driving with the
owner's consent, may subject the owner to respondeat superior lia-
bility. Plainly this development, too, does not go so far as the product
liability cases.
It will be useful, nevertheless, to consider what brought the legis-
lation about. There can be no real doubt that the main cause was the
flood of personal injury cases involving automobiles, and the at-
tendant social need to provide victims with a responsible source of
recovery.32 A few courts went so far as to say that automobiles are
"inherently dangerous." .3 But the majority would have none of that.
Other courts, more ingenious, were able to visualize the ownership
of a car for family use as an enterprise, so that, when the car was
driven with the owner's consent by some member of the family,
losses due to negligent operation were to be borne by the owner-
regardless of fault on his part.34
31 CAL. VEMcLE CODE § 17150.
32 Both points were well made in King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 225-26, 204 S.W.
296, 298 (1918), a leading case, where the court said: "It is true that an automobile
is not a dangerous instrumentality so as to make the owner liable, as in the case of a
wild animal loose on the streets; but, as a matter of practical justice to those who are
injured, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that an automobile possesses excessive weight
that it is capable of running at a rapid rate of speed, and when moving rapidly upon the
streets of a populous city, it is dangerous to life and limb and must be operated with care.
If an instrument of this kind is placed in the hands of his family by a father, for the
family's pleasure, comfort and entertainment, the dictates of natural justice should require
that the owner should be responsible for its negligent operation, because only by doing
so, as a general rule, can substantial justice be attained. A judgment for damages against
an infant daughter or an infant son ... would be an empty form."
33 Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920), see Note,
The Family Automobile, 2 VA. L. Rv. 189 (1914).
34 See for example, Wolf v. Sulik, 93 Conn. 431, 437, 106 A. 443, 444-45 (1919),
4 A.L.R. 356 (1919), where Judge Beach stated the theory quite plausibly: "In this case
the defendant desired to maintain a pleasure car for the convenience of her husband.
If in carrying out her purpose she had employed a chauffeur to drive him about, she
would have been liable, on the principle above stated [respondeat superior], for the
chauffeur's neglect while so engaged. Now, suppose that she chooses to eliminate the
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But the courts in many of the larger states-New York,35 Texas,3 6
Illinois,s ' California3 -- were unable to go even that far. In New York,
in Van Blaricom v. Dodgson,3 9 decided in 1917, the court refused to
countenance the idea that a son while driving his father's car for his
own pleasure could be said to be in any sense an agent. As Hiscock,
C. J., pointed out, to have recovery in such case a plaintiff must argue
"that because the use of an automobile upon a highway may be dan-
gerous.., the courts can apply a different rule of agency... ."40 than
would apply, for example, when a horse or a boat is put in the hands
of a minor. Then, continuing: "But the rules of principal and agent
are not'thus to be formulated. They are believed to be constant and
not variable in response to the supposed exigencies of some particular
situation."41
Only the year before the court had decided MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.,42 but that case does not appear to have been argued in
the Van Blaricom proceeding. Of course, it can be said that it is one
thing to find an "implied warranty" or a "representation" of safety,
as later cases have done, to aid the automobile victim and another
to imply an "agency" to the same end, but the difference is not great.
At all events, the court suggested the matter was one for the legisla-
ture, which no doubt was a wise thing to do.
43
When the legislature got at the job, it swept away the family pur-
pose limitation and enacted broadly that:
Every owner of a motor vehicle operated on the public highway
shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or
property resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor
vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person
legally using or operating the same with the permission, express or
implied, of such owner.44
chauffeur and to authorize her husband [poor man] to drive himself about. There seems
to be no reason, except the traditional limitations of the rule respondeat superior, why she
should not also be liable for his neglect while so engaged."
35Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N.Y. 111, 115 N.E. 443 (1917).
3 6 Trice v. Bridgewater, 125 Tex. 75, 81 S.W.2d 63 (1935).
37 White v. Seitz, 342 Ill. 266, 174 N.E. 371 (1931).
38 Perry v. Simeone, 197 Cal. 132, 239 Pac. 1056 (1925).
89 220 N.Y. ill, 115 N.E. 443 (1917).
40 Id. at 116, 115 N.E. at 445.
41 Id. at 116-17, 115 N.E. at 445.
42217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
43 Norman D. Lattin, in an able article, Vicarious Liability and the Family Auto-
mobile, 26 MIcE. L. REzv. 846 (1928), favored legislation. At 869, he said that any statute
should be "broad enough to cover not only the family situation cases, but also the cases
where a third party is using.the car with the owner's permission."
44See Grant v. Knepper, 245 N.Y. 158, 156 N.E. 650 (1997), 54 A.L.R. 845
(1928), where N.Y. H'wAY LAw § 282(e) is interpreted.
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It is fair to say that statutes of this type derive from several sources.
They include enterprise liability, where in theory the proprietor or
owner may offset his losses against his gain or profit, but they are not
so limited. In some measure, too, they trace back to the early law
concerning "inherently dangerous" things. As respects third persons,
who may suffer "death or injuries to person or property resulting from
negligence," the owner lets a car out of his keeping at his peril. True,
at common law, the wild animal does the injury, and, under the statute,
it is the car operator, but that is not a significant difference from the
victim's viewpoint. Today, the owner in each case is liable without
fault on his part.
Work~men's Compensation
The legislature has had to take a hand in yet another area involv-
ing "death or injuries to person," that of industrial accidents to work-
men.45 Nor do the courts have much to be proud of here. It was open
to them once to have said that respondeat superior applied fully as
much when one employee injures another, as when some third per-
son is injured. But they chose a different course-perhaps more in
keeping with the intensely individualistic spirit of the time-and
said that the injured workman must look to his fellow employee, the
so called "wrongdoer," for redress.4 This, in spite of the fact that
most of such losses might well be treated as industry losses; that gen-
erally the employer has the best opportunity to avoid accidents; and,
that recovery against a fellow workman often is but "an empty form,"47
or no real recovery at all.
At all events, when the problem finally reached the various legis-
latures-after nearly a century of dreary, frustrating litigation-they
went much farther than simply to extend the respondeat superior
remedy to cover injured workmen. Regardless of fault on the part of
the employer, as by failure to provide a safe place to work;48 regard-
less of the follow servant rule, which was abolished; regardless of
"contributory negligence" or "assumption of risk," those twin defences
which had defeated so many actions through the years;49 it was de-
4 5 See LARsON, WOKIEMN'S COMPENSATION, (1965).
4 6 The opinion of Shaw, C. J., in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45
Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 38 Am. Dec. 339 (1842) was most influential in establishing the
"fellow servant" exception in this country; that of Lord Abbinger, in Priestly v. Fowler,
3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837), the "common employment" rule in
England.
47 Grant v, Knepper, 245 N.Y. 158, 164, 156 N.E. 650, 652 (1927).
48 See, Flike v. Boston & Albany R.R., 53 N.Y. 549 (1873).
49 A nice example is Yaconi v. Brady & Gioe, Inc., 246 N.Y. 300, 158 N.E. 876
(1927).
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dared to be enough that an employee had suffered injury "arising out
of and in the course of the employment." 0 In such case the injured
workman was entitled to recover compensation for his injuries. The
general consensus had come to be that the risks of industry were to
be borne by industry. Whether the accident was caused by the em-
ployer, by a fellow servant, or by the injured man's own negligence5 --
or had just happened-was not material.
Strict Liability
Plainly, the idea of enterprise liability has vitality. Also it is clear
that it has been the dire predicament of the citizen who has suffered
personal injury which has brought about change. Both courts and
legislatures have been concerned. In fact, although developments
have gone on at a different pace and by different means in each of
the four areas discussed, there has been substantial agreement as to
the ends to be achieved. The inquiry now, therefore, will have to do
with means, that is the extent to which "strict liability" applies-or
may come to apply-in each area. A related question, the extent to
which enterprise losses may be shifted back to management or the
operating workmen at fault, will be considered in a moment.. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.52 the court's main thrust was
directed at the privity barrier. By building on many antecedents con-
cerning "inherently dangerous" things-fire, wild animals, drugs-it
was not too difficult for Judge Cardozo to put an automobile with a
defective wheel in that category. Thus it followed easily enough,
particularly where the manufacturer had been negligent, that there
should be liability to any user who had suffered injury caused by the
defect. Judge Cardozo said: "We have put aside the notion that the
duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence
may be forseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have
put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have put
its source in the law."
53
Actually the next step, that of imposing "strict liability," was not
so much a departure from, as a more accurate rendering of, the old
law. Negligence was not a factor in determining one's liability for
keeping inherently dangerous things,54 any more than it is in determin-
50 CAL. LAnoR CODE § 3600.
51 The policy is to protect men and their dependents from the serious losses caused
by accident, not to assess fault. See Puffin v. General Electric Co., 132 Conn. 279, 43
A.2d 746 (1945).
62217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
53 Id. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053.
54 See Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (E. & I. App.).
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ing liability for a false representation. And, whichever rationalization
is used, the policy reasons are no less urgent today than formerly.
The danger to "life and limb" is surely no less, and the victim's op-
portunity 'to safeguard against injury, as by inspection or by taking
care, is often as non-existent now as then. Lastly, the victim's need
for a dependable source of recovery, lest he become a public charge,
is surely as great. Thus, Judge Cardozo was quite right, though he
insisted on a showing of negligence, in saying that the manufacturer's
liability found "its source in the law."
The 'law" of the product cases compares most closely with work-
men's compensation. In both, any question of fault is gone. Liability
is strict. Of course, the claimant in each must show a connection: in
one that the manufacturer "put out" a "defective product" and that
injury ensued; in the other that the workman was injured in an acci-
dent which "arose out of and in the course of' his employment. Nor
are these necessarily perfunctory matters, as the recent Corvair litiga-
tion55 will testify in the product area, and as the large amount of
"arising-out-of" litigation establishes in the compensation field.56 But
that is all; it is not necessary to show also that injury was caused by
someone acting "in the scope of his employment" or to embark upon
the task of persuading court or jury that the defendant or someone on
his side was "negligent."
Perhaps workmen's compensation goes a step beyond the "strict
liability" of the product ,cases. For there is a tendency in some of the
latter to require a degree of care on the part of the product user.
Either it is said the manufacturer may expect "normal use," or, to
quote Dean Prosser, the consumer may expect no more than that the
product will be "reasonably fit for the purpose, for which it is sold."57
In the case of an injured workman-intoxication and deliberate
-accident to one side-it is quite immaterial that the injury may have
been caused by the workman's own fault. Moreover, this is as it
should be, for accidents are no respecters of persons-even the most
careful and competent workman may on a given day be guilty of
what in the personal injury cases is termed "negligence." The ensuing
55 For an unofficial discussion of the litigation see, Reinhardt, "Corvair in Court,"
San Francisco Magazine, September 1965, p. 24. See also "Strict Liability Suits Pile up
for Auto Makers," Business Week, August 28, 1965, p. 30.
56 Bianchi, Workmen's Compensation: Meaning of the Phrase "Arising out of
Employment" as Used in the California Labor Code, 8 HAsn xNs L.J. 49 (1956).
57 Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE




accident, irrespective of whether he or some other employee is hurt,
is truly an enterprise liability.
Which prompts the question, why not apply "strict liability" when
an owner puts a car on the road, in the typical respondeat superior
situation? The number of road accidents, their unpredictability, and
the helplessness of the victim are surely no less here than in either
of the two areas just discussed. But, however plausible it might be
to do so, we have not yet gone so far as to say that a manufacturer who
"represents" his products to be "safe" may also be found to represent
that the truck and driver *he puts on the road in the course of his
business are equally safe. Truck, as respects defects, perhaps yes; 8
but driver, if competent, no. In spite of some countervailing evidence,
truck drivers have not yet been declared dangerous instrumentalities.
It is true the motor vehicle statutes have lessened the plaintiff's
burden. In other words, it is easier to prove "consent,"59 than it is to
show that the driver acted within "the scope of his employment," as
required by the respondeat superior cases. But both statute and doc-
trine require proof of "negligence." Nor has any viable system of in-
surance, that is, of strict liability, yet been proposed, which would
eliminate that need.60
Employer's Indemnity
From what has been said, it would seem that once enterprise
liability has been established-by whatever means-the matter should
end there. In other words, whether responsibility has been put on
enterprise by "strict liability," as in the product cases; by statute, as in
workmen's compensation; or by respondeat superior, the result should
be the same. But such is not the fact. It is true, though, that in the
product cases there appears to have been n'o suggestion that enterprise
5 sThere is a dearth of authoritj, hence the doubt. But the old obstacle raised in
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), that the field
of possible plaintiffs would be too large, is scarcely valid. First, some products' cases
themselves now allow general recovery. Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 375
Mich. 85, 133 N.W.2d 129 (1965) (plaintiff an injured by-stander). And, of course,
there was never any limitation of the sort in respondeat superior.
59 Some cases, particularly the early ones, sought to equate "consent" with "scope."
Chaika v. Vandenberg, 252 N.Y. 101, 169 N.E. 103 (1929). But see Souza v. Corti,
22 Cal. 2d 454, 139 P.2d 645 (1943); Baker v. Rhode Island Ice Co., 72 R.I. 262, 50
A.2d 618 (1946).
60 For an extremely able and provocative study, see Blum & Kalven, Public Law
Perspectives on a Private Problem-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 641
(1964), where most of the literature is cited. Compare Ehrenzweig, "Full Aid" Insur-
ance for the Traffic Vitim-A Voluntary Compensation Plan, 43 CALm. L. REv. 1
(1955).
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losses may or should be shifted back to management or to the workmen
at fault. Nor has it been proposed that the injured third person should,
at his pleasure, be able to recover either from the manufacturer or from
those persons in the manufacturer's employ who were to blame in
making or putting out the defective product.
The products battle, thus far, has centered on strict liability.
Besides, when a manufacturer has the resources of the Buick Company,
as in MacPherson,6' there would be little incentive to seek a remedy
against management or the employees involved. Of course, one may be
sure the thing would not rest there, for Buick may well have made
changes and perhaps applied sanctions within its organization, follow-
ing the court's decision.62 But this is not the same thing at all as to
saddle such persons with direct liability in tort to the injured person.
It is even doubtful that direct liability could be asserted, for long
ago, in Lane v. Cotton,6 Lord Holt established the point that "a servant
or deputy, quatenas such, cannot be charged for neglect, but the prin-
cipal only shall be charged for it.... "6 4 The subsequent long line of
non-feasance cases is testimony to Holes sturdy good sense.65 It will
not do to permit the "assault upon the citadel of privity"66 to make
tortfeasors of the many persons who may have been responsible in
some measure for a defective product.
In fact, it is possible that there is growing acceptance of the idea
that enterprise should accept final responsibility. But, even in the area
of workmen's compensation, the question has had a varied response.
The early cases, while approving an award of compensation to the
injured workman, as a risk of the industry, saw nothing inconsistent in
then permitting the injured workman (or his employer, by subroga-
tion) to recover over from the negligent fellow workman, thus forcing
him to take the ultimate loss.6 7 Indeed, it was suggested that recovery
in such case would have a deterrent effect, much to be desired.68 But
61217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
62The salary and advancement of the technical people responsible for the defect
may have suffered.
63 12 Mod. 473, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458 (K.B. 1796).
64 Id. at 488, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1467.
65 E.g., Franklin v. May Dep't Stores Co., 25 F. Supp. 735 (E.D. Mo. 1938)
(manager not to be charged with liability to third person for failure to repair revolving
door).
66 The phrase used by Cardozo, C. J., in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven &
Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931), wherein it was held that a firm
of accountants was not liable to third persons for mere negligence in preparing a state-
ment for the employer.
67 But see Peet v. Mills, 76 Wash. 437, 136 Pac. 685 (1913).
68 Lees v. Dunkerley Bros., [1911] A.C. 5 (H.L. 1910).
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the more enlightened jurisdictions have come to realize that the case
for deterrence has never been proven. At the same time there is much
to suggest that by putting ultimate losses on the employer something
can and will be done to reduce the incidence of industrial accidents. It
is the employer who has the selection of men,69 who develops work
rules, and who may provide improved equipment.
California did not reach this position until 1959. As late as 1955, in
Singleton v. Bronnesen,70 the court could say, "we know of no rule
prohibiting suit by one [employee] against the other for damages on
account of negligence... ."71 But in 1959 the statute was amended to
provide that compensation is "the exclusive remedy for injury or death
of an employee against the employer or against any other employee of
the employer acting within the scope of his employment ....- 72
Thereby, California joined the growing group of states which recognize
that industrial accidents are a matter of enterprise liability. After all,
it was a perverse rule, indeed, which could say to a highly competent
and careful workman, after many years of satisfactory service, that if
he should make just one mistake, his life savings might be taken away
by a fellow servant-or more likely by an insurance carrier-to satisfy
a damage claim.
It is not clear that the California court so understands the 1959
amendment. In Saala v. McFarland,73 Justice Peek quoted an unnamed
Industrial Accident Commission referee to the point that: "[T]he
purpose of section 3601 [as amended] is to make workmen's compen-
sation the exclusive remedy of an injured workman against his em-
ployer."74 With all respect, nothing could be farther from the mark;
it was already clear enough that the sole remedy of an injured work-
man "against his employer" is for compensation; but there was real
need to take away from the employer his power to subvert the basic
purposes of the act by putting his compensation losses back on one or
another workman who could be described as "negligent."
To gain that end, labor-and the provision has had general labor
support-was willing to deny the injured workman his right at
69 Perhaps the union may one day incur liability here.
70 131 Cal. App. 2d 327, 280 P.2d 481 (1955).
71 id. at 327, 280 P.2d at 482.
72 CA . LABor CODE § 3601. (Emphasis added.)
73 63 A.C. 120, 45 Cal. Bptr. 144, 403 P.2d 400 (1965). Had the court taken the
view suggested here-though one may not quarrel with its holding-it might have
pressed to extend the negligent employee's immunity to the full reach of workman's com-
pensation, rather than to preserve the injured person's common law remedy so far as
possible.
74 Id. at 125, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 148, 403 P.2d at 404.
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common law to sue his fellow worker, strange as that may sound to a
personal injury lawyer' 5 By so doing, though, the ground was cut from
under the employer and his insurance carrier; there simply was no
action left to which they could be subrogated. And so, at long last, the
1959 amendment made industrial accidents truly a matter of enterprise
liability.
Only respondeat superior is out of step. It was not always so, for
there is no record until well into the last century that much thought was
given to the servant's liability. As Shaw, C. J., put it, liability to third
persons was basically the employer's risk: "[E]very man, in the man-
agement of his own affairs, whether by himself or by his .agents or
servants, shall so conduct them as not to injure another."76 But some-
where in the century defense counsel gained the point that this was
not true at all, the employer-though he controlled the enterprise and
took its gains and profits-was in no way at "fault"; only the servant
was a "wrongdoer."
In some states it was even held that if the servant in the course of
the employer's work should happen to injure his wife, there could be
no recovery. Liability had become wholly "derivative," and, since a
wife might not. sue her husband at common law, it followed that she
might not sue his employer.7 It should be unnecessary to point out
that there likewise is no "fault" on the part of the employer in the
"product" cases or under workmen's compensation and yet liability is
put on the enterprise.
To the credit of many courts, the respondeat superior remedy has
been kept in better perspective. In Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon
Co.,71 for example; which was an action by a wife against her husband's
employer, Cardozo, C. J., said the statement sometimes made that an
employer's liability "is derivative and secondary ... means this and
nothing more, that at times the fault of the actor will fix the quality of
75 The similar New York statute is discussed in Caulfield v. Elmhurst Contracting
Co., 268 App. Div. 661, 664, 53 N.Y.S.2d 25, 29 (1945), where the court said the
provision "means just what is says ...."
76 Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49, 55-56, 38 Am.
Dec. 339, 340 (1842).
77 Cf. Myers v. Tranquility Irrigation Dist., 26 Cal. App. 2d 385, 79 P.2d 419
(1938) (where minor child was denied recovery against the father's employer). Com-
pare Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221 Cal. App. 2d 431, 34 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1963).
78 The precise point has become moot in California, for the Supreme Court in a
series of good cases has removed the married woman's common law disability. See
especially the fine opinion by Justice Peters in Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 26 Cal. Rptr.
97, 376 P.2d 65 (1962).
79249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928), 64 A.L.R. 293 (1929). See also, 1 A.L.R.3d
677, 689 (1965).
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the act."80 But, he continued, a "trespass, negligent or willful, upon the
person of a wife, does not cease to be an unlawful act though the law
exempts the husband from liability for the damage."8' Hence, the
enterprise was held liable.
Of more serious consequence, this insistence on the "derivative"
nature of the remedy has enabled employers, in theory at least, to put
all their respondeat superior losses on their employees. This too has
been the work of the law courts. Of course the negligent servant-even
in early times--was liable in trespass to the injured third person, as
he is today; but until late last century he served only as a sort of "con-
duit,"83 to quote Francis, J., and proof of his part in the matter was
presented only in order to fix the extent and quality of the employer's
liability.
By the end of the century, however, cases began to appear 84 saying
that, since the employer had been forced to pay a claim to a third
person "which ought to have been paid by the wrongdoer," 85 it was but
fair to give the employer, by subrogation, the third person's action.
Thus-all within less than a century-the employee's" state was
changed from one of virtual non-liability to one of complete liability-
which also was "no small step."86 And one, it is suggested, in the wrong
direction.
The key here lies in the word "ought." For the fall protection of
injured third persons, judgment may be had against either or both the
employer and his negligent employee. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid, the
servant is a "wrongdoer," at least as to such persons. But as between
employer and employee, where the ultimate loss "ought" to be placed
is another matter. It is suggested this depends on contract.
In the recent case of Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co.,
Ltd.,87 Viscount Simonds for the House of Lords agreed, but he then
proceeded to imply a term in the contract to the effect that an em-
ployee engages not only to have the "ability and skill" usual to his
calling, but without fail to "use" these qualities.88 That is, an employee
80 Id. at 256, 164 N.E. at 43.
81 Id. at 256-57, 164 N.E. at 43.
82 Lane v. Cotton, 12 Mod. 473, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458 (K.B. 1796).
83 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
84A leading case is Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Compania Transatlantica
Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987 (1892) (a lease case), where some master-servant
cases are cited.
85 Id. at 468, 31 N.E. at 989.
86 Note, McPherson v. Buick Comes of Age, 4 U. Car. L. REv. 461, 469 (1937).
87 [1957] A.C. 555 (H.L. 1956).
88 Id. at 573.
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engages never to make a mistake. Since Lister-admittedly an experi-
enced and competent driver-had failed one Saturday morning to keep
a fully adequate lookout when backing up a lorry, it followed, the court
said, that he had breached his contract. Therefore, he must indemnify
his employer; the accident risks of the Romford business were to be
borne by its employees.
The Romford89 case, of course, was severely criticized.90 No lorry
driver, any more than a corporate officer or director,91 engages to be
infallible. At most they agree to be competent, and to carry on their
work with the care and skill that others in the same category of em-
ployment commonly use. This means, to speak bluntly, that an accident
may happen without breach of contract. Plainly the employer buys no
more; if he wants to be rid of all risk, he engages an independent
contractor, gives over control, and pays accordingly. When so much
is said, though, it is evident that in many personal injury cases today
the servant "ought" not be held liable to his employer.
Of course, if the employee should not be competent, was intoxi-
cated, or had brought on the accident intentionally or with gross lack
of care, he should be liable 2-- either for breach of his employment
contract, or by way of subrogation. In a sense he could then be said to
have made the' accident his own; but short of that the losses due to
"negligence," so called, would seem properly to be borne by the enter-
prise93 -as much here as in the product cases or in workmen's com-
pensation.
89 Id. at 555.
90 Davis, Some Reflections on Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd.,
33 N.Z.L.J. 187 (1957); Williams, Vicarious Liability and the Master's Indemnity, 20
MoDmN L. REV. 220, 437 (1957); Steffen, The Employer's "Indemnity" Action, 25 U.
Cm. L. REV. 465 (1958); Pedrick, Civil Liability of an Employee toward his Employer,
His Fellow Employees and Third Parties: United States Report, 18 RuTcGEs L. RE:. 489
(1964).
91 The rule in England as to directors is both generous and enlightened; they may
not be held liable for company losses which they cause in good faith, unless guilty of
gross negligence. See Overend & Gurney Co. v. Gibb, [1872] L.R. 5 H.L. 480.
92 Likewise the negligent employee has no immunity as against an injured fellow
worker, if he failed in these respects. CAL. LABOR CODE § 3601.
93 A word should be said regarding CAL. VEHcL.E CODE § 17153, which provides
a limited subrogation action, by owner against user, for losses caused by the latter in
operation of the car. The provision probably serves a useful purpose in fixing a definite
liability upon the casual user; it would seem to have little point where the owner's
minor child is the user; and, when the driver is an employee, would appear to run
counter to the above suggestions. But, if the employee's contract were to state explicitly,
as many teamsters' contracts do, that the driver would not be liable to his employer for
-these run-of-the-mill accidents, which are largely unavoidable, traffic conditions being
what they are, it is hard to see how -the statute could apply. A court in such case might
well read the provision as if prefaced by the phrase, "unless otherwise agreed."
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Support should be found for this position, if correct, in the joint
venture cases. That is, if one of two partners in carrying on their enter-
prise should accidentally injure a third person, the loss-as between
the partners-should be allocated according to their contract. So much
seems obvious. It will not do to say that since the partner may have
been found "negligent"-as respects a third person-it necessarily
follows he violated the partnership agreement. Liability to third per-
sons, under the reasonable man test, is absolute; the standard of care
which one partner may be said to owe his co-partner, in the conduct
of the joint business, must tolerate some error.
Although this is well enough recognized as a general proposition,94
there strangely is law to the contrary in the personal injury cases. One
of the most cited holdings is United Brokers Co. v. Dose.95 There the
plaintiff and defendant had formed a joint venture to finance and assist
a farmer in growing a crop of potatoes. One day, while driving on
venture business to inspect some potatoes, defendant Dose negligently
injured a third person; subsequently he settled the claim. The issue
litigated was whether, on an accounting, Dose might properly charge
this loss to the venture. Holding in the negative, the Oregon court said:
"The law of partnership is the law of agency. Each partner is the agent
of the other, and impliedly agrees that he will exercise reasonable care
and diligence in the operation of the partnership business. When a
loss is paid by a partnership, there is a right of indemnity against the
partner who caused the loss."9
Thus we are right back where we started. A joint venturer, too,
impliedly agrees never to err. But some courts have shown greater
insight. For example, in Johnson v. Fischer,97 two women embarked on
a joint venture to go fishing; catching no fish, they stopped at several
94 E.g., in Hurter v. Larrabee, 224 Mass. 218, 112 N.E. 613 (1916), Rugg, C.J.,
said: "There is no general principle of partnership which renders one partner liable to
his copartners for his honest mistakes. So far as losses result to a firm from errors of
judgment of one partner not amounting to fraud, bad faith, or reckless disregard of his
obligations, they must be borne by the partnership. Each partner owes to the firm the
duty of faithful service according to the best of his ability. But, in 'the absence of special
agreement, no partner guarantees his own capacity." Id. at 220-21, 112 N.E. at 614. See
also 40 Am. Jur. Partnership § 493 at 468 (1942).
95143 Ore. 283, 22 P.2d 204 (1933). And see PNossnm, ToRTs § 48 at 279 (3d ed.
1964) where the author says: "Thus it is generally agreed that there may be indemnity in
favor of one who is held responsible solely by imputation of law because of his relation
to the actual wrongdoer, as where . . .an innocent partner . . .is held liable for the
acts of another ...."
96 143 Ore. at 286, 22 P.2d at 205.
97292 Mich. 78, 290 N.W. 334 (1940).
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places for food and beer; and then, on the way home, while the car
was being driven by Mrs. Fischer (the owner), it went out of control
on a curve, and both were injured. Mrs; Johnson sued Mrs. Fischer for
indemnity, since the latter had obviously been "negligent" and had
"caused the loss." But Justice Potter for the Michigan court denied
recovery:
This was a joint venture, not for profit, but for pleasure and recreation
with a hope of prospective reward in acquiring fish, undertaken for
the mutual benefit and satisfaction of each of the parties. It had many
of the usual incidents of. a fishing trip. It was unfortunate the auto-
mobile got out of control, that both of the parties were injured, but
the liability of the defendant Mae Fischer in this case is no greater
than the liability of the plaintiff Nettie W. Johnson who induced her
to take the trip.
98
Neither of these courts put their holdings explicitly on the contract
of the joint venturers. Had they done so, it is suggested that the
Michigan court would still have reached the same result. That is, if one
were to spell out the Johnson-Fischer agreement it would include an
engagement that Mrs. Fischer was a competent driver and that she
would endeavor to drive at least as carefully as other fishing trip
partners customarily do;99 she would not agree to be infallible. Jt passes
belief that the two venturers in the Oregon case would have come to
an essentially different agreement, had they seen fit to write it out
before the accident occurred.100 Thus, there being no showing of inten-
tional wrong or of gross carelessness (which would clearly amount to
a breach of contract), the Oregon loss too should have been held to be
one for the enterprise. 1 1
The point may become clearer when the venture is between two
separate businesses. At all events, Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Bean'02 was
such a case, the venture being set up between one O'Leary, who put up
9s Id. at 82, 290 N.W. at 336. Subsequent Michigan cases have weakened this
decision. In Bostrom v. Jennings, 326 Mich. 146, 40 N.W.2d 97 (1949), the majority
thought the case went off on the assumption that the negligence of the driver was "im-
puted" to plaintiff. Of course, in an action between partners, as in an action between
master and servant, that is not true. But there is no word in the Johnson opinion to
suggest that the court decided on that ground. Then, in Sherman v. Korff, 353 Mich.
387, 91 N.W.2d 485 (1958), the court raises some doubt whether a "joint venture"
existed in the Johnson case, but that is beside the point discussed here.
09 The evidence on this point should be quite interesting.
100 And it is passing strange that a court would take it upon itself to write a different
agreement for them.
101 The action in the Johnson-Fischer case was for indemnity. Had it lIeen for con-
tribution, the plaintiff logically would have recovered one half of her loss.
102 134 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1943)
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the money to buy a mill, and Olympia Supply Co., which agreed to
dismantle and sell the property on a profit sharing basis. In the course
of the work, one Abe Bean, employed by Olympia, let a blow torch get
out of hand, and the property was destroyed by fire. Plaintiff insurance
company paid the loss to O'Leary, who had taken a policy on the
property, and then brought suit for indemnity against Olympia, charg-
ing that it was negligent in that it was responsible for Abe's actions in
the course of his employment. Thus the case could plausibly be brought
within the 'law" of the Dose 0 3 case; each partner "impliedly agrees
that he will exercise reasonable care and diligence...."104
But Judge Haney held to the contrary. After determining that there
was a joint venture, he went on to say:
Appellants rightly contend, we think, that where one member of a
joint enterprise, sues another, the doctrine of imputed negligence
does not apply'05 . . . However, appellants erroneously apply
the rule, we think. They impute the negligence of Abe Bean to
the company and then apply the rule as between OLeary and the
company. This, we think is erroneous. Since appellants are in the
same position . . . and since neither O'Leary nor the company was
guilty of positive negligence, it would be a strange situation to im-
pute negligence to only one of two equally faultless parties in the
same position.1
6
The court said further that, for purposes of the case, Abe's negli-
gence would not be imputed either to O'Leary or to the Olympia com-
pany. An equally true statement, it would seem, is that his negligence
could be imputed to both, that is, to the joint enterprise.' Either way
the result would be that, as the court said, "unless they can show
positive negligence on the part of the company,"108 there could be no
action for indemnity. Thus, at most, the plaintiff insurance company--
standing in the shoes of O'Leary-should have had contribution.
This, moreover, is the practical view. Such discussion as has been
103 143 Ore. 283, 22 P.2d 204 (1933).
104 Id. at 286, 22 P.2d at 205.
105 134 F.2d at 758, citing O'Brien v. Woldson, 149 Wash. 192, 270 P. 304 (1928),
62 A.L.R. 436 (1929).
106 134 F.2d at 758.
107But the court's analysis is the better one. The torts man appears to start with
the false premise that there can be no liability without fault. Hence he "imputes" negli-
gence to an employer, or to a joint venturer, when a third person sues. Agency begins
the other way; the enterprise is liable without fault (as in the products cases, workmen's
compensation, and respondeat superior) and thus there is no need to "impute" anything.
RlsATm'mNT (SEcoND) AGENCY § 219 (1958). It contributes little but confusion to
talk of "imputed" negligence.
108 134 F.2d at 758.
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possible with accountants experienced in joint venture matters indi-
cates that the usual business losses of each partner due to employee
negligence-whether arising from property damage; the waste of
materials; workmen's compensation awards; claims of third persons
for injury-all are to be charged to the enterprise. These are costs of
doing business and do not convict either partner-as between them-
selves-of blame.
It is doubtful that California would go along with this reasoning.
In Leming v. Oilfields Trucking Co.0 9 (the first of a series of cases
growing out of a joint venture between Oilfields Trucking Co. and
Phoenix Construction Co. to do a job of highway resurfacing) it was
recognized that both corporations could be held liable to plaintiff for
his injuries, although the negligent driver, Mason, was employed only
by Oilfields. This on familiar principles.1 0 In later cases the question
was reached how the loss of some 212,585.69 dollars should be borne
by the several insurance companies. Writing for the court in the last of
these, Continental Casualty Co. v. Phoenix Construction Co.,"' Justice
Schauer held that the whole loss was to be put on Mason's insurer.
The Continental112 case turned on two elementary points. First, the
court stated broadly that whenever an employer has been held liable
for "the unauthorized negligent act of his employee, the employer may
recoup his loss in an action against the negligent employee.... ." More-
over, anything appearing to the contrary in prior cases "must be
deemed disapproved."" 3 Secondly, it was said that, upon equitable
principles, an insurer who has paid a third party judgment against an
employer may recover over against the negligent employee or his
insurer. "' Hence, in effect, it followed that if Continental (the Phoenix
109 44 Cal. 2d 343, 282 P.2d 23 (1055), 51 A.L.R.2d 107 (1957).
110 See, e.g., Shook v. Beals, 96 Cal. App. 2d 963, 217 P.2d 56 (1950), 18 A.L.R.2d
919 (1951); Judge v. Wallen, 98 Neb. 154, 152 N.W. 318 (1915).
"'l46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 (1956).
112 Id. at 428, 296 P.2d at 804.
"13 Id. at 429, 296 P.2d at 804. When the court comes to review this position, care-
ful attention will be due United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954). There the
Supreme Court, on full examination of the problem, refused to give the government, as
employer, an automatic recovery against a negligent employee. Likewise, in Johnson v.
Partrederiet Brovigtank, 202 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), a stevedore contractor was
denied recovery against his employees, the loss being regarded as one for the employer,
in spite of the employees' "negligence."
114 The court cited as authority, Canadian Indemnity Co. v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 213 F.2d 658, 659 (9th Cir. 1954), but that was not a joint venture
case at all. It is one thing for an employer to recover in full, it is another to permit a
co-adventurer to do so.
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Construction Co. insurer) bad paid the loss to the third person, it might
recover full indemnity from Mason or his insurer.
On the first point, little more need be said. The court disregarded
the employee's contract, whatever it may have been."' It sufficed that
he had been "negligent" in a third party sense. But the court's use of
the word "unauthorized" gives pause, for it would seem to mean that
if an employer authorizes a particular action which results in injury
to a third person, the employer may not then in good conscience put
the loss back on his employee by subrogation." 6 The rule, thus, does
admit of exceptions." 7 On the second point, it is respectfully submitted
the court incorrectly disregarded the joint venture. The most that
Phoenix should recover from Oilfields, if it had paid the third party
claim, would be one half of the loss as contribution, and hence that
should be the extent of any recovery over which it might have against
Mason or his insurer. Continental had no relation with Mason except
through the joint venture.
Finally
It is time to return to the Santor"18 case, which held, you will recall,
that a retail buyer of a defective carpet may proceed directly against
the manufacturer for redress. It should be evident that the New Jersey
court underplayed things more than a little when it said: "True, the
rule of implied warranty had its gestative stirrings because of the
greater appeal of the personal injury claim."" 9 Plainly, it has been the
"15 If Mason was a member of the teamsters' union, the point may have been cov-
ered. At least, the National Master Freight Agreement for February 1, 1964 to March 31,
1967, provides in art. 10: "Employees shall not be charged for loss or damage unless
clear proof of gross negligence is shown. This Article is not to be construed as permitting
charges for loss or damage to equipment under any circumstances." CCH LAB. L. RPa,.
59, 944 (1965). The evident purpose here is to put such losses on enterprise, even as
suggested in the text, where they may be covered by insurance and settled with a mini-
mum of wasteful labor-management controversy.
1 For a case so holding see Opper v. Tripp Lake Estates Inc., 274 App. Div. 422,
84 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1948), aff'd 300 N.Y. 572. Moreover, if the employee were required to
pay the third person in such case, he should have indemnity from his employer. If so,
the basis for his action has not been better stated than by Judge L. Hand in Admiral
Oriental Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201, 202 (1936): "The doctrine stands upon the
fact that the venture is the principal's, and that, as the profits will be his, so should be the
expenses.
17 No other meaning can plausibly be given the court's use of "unauthorized"; if
taken literally the employee would probably not have been acting in the scope of his
employment, and thus the issue could not arise. See dicta, Bradley v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal.
420, 424, 97 Pac. 875, 876 (1908).
118 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
".9 Id. at 60, 207 A.2d at 309.
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plight of the person unavoidably injured which has fathered all the law
above discussed. Conversely, contrary to the court's holding, no show-
ing of urgency has yet been contrived to call for similar emergency
treatment on behalf of the contract claimant.
After all, retailers are not all mere "conduits," 20 as justice Francis
would have it.121 Nor can it be said convincingly that modern sales
machinery, as it concerns the customer, has become unduly complex.12'
If anything, the contrary is true.' 2 But, of greater significance, the
customer has a choice, both in the selection of the dealer he will trade
with and to a degree in the contract he makes. Thus, when it is con-
sidered further that the customer's contract claim will rarely exceed the
amount of the purchase price, it is evident that his risk may be kept
within bounds' 24
It is because the tort claimant's position varies so greatly, being not
only fortuitous but perhaps calamitous, that the courts have turned to
strict liability. In such situation, as Justice Traynor pointed out in his
concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,125
there is virtue in putting liability on the manufacturer, the one best
able to anticipate and bear the risks involved.
But there is another aspect: The retailer has long enjoyed a valued
place in society, entitled to the rewards and subject to the liabilities,
which may come to any independent enterprise. He plays an invaluable
role in the distributive system, to the advantage of both manufacturer
and customer. The New Jersey holding, however, if widely followed,
would upset long standing sales and credit arrangements, and greatly
120 Consider, for one example, Sears, Roebuck and Co.
121 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 60, 207 A.2d 305, 309. "The
dealer is simply a way station, a conduit on its trip from manufacturer to consumer."
Id. at 309.
122 Consider the 18th century case of Newsom v. Thorton, 6 East. 17, 20 n.a., 102
Eng. Rep. 189, 1191 n.a. (K.B. 1805).
123 His warranty position is much stronger. Compare the Code provisions with the
law of McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55, 34 Am. Dec. 497 (Pa. 1839).
124 Of course, if the customer selects a dealer who fails in business and departs for
Maine, as the dealer did in the Santor case, there will be loss, both to the customer and
probably to'the manufacturer. But this is a normal business risk. The rule adopted by
the New Jersey court, on the other hand, would entail a greater evil, for it would tend
to cut all dealers down to one size in the customer's view, and thus deprive the capable
right-dealing merchant of his hard earned position. Why bother to trade with a respon-
sible dealer, if recourse may be had against the manufacturer in any event?
125 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). See also Traynor, The Ways and Mean-
ings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. Rnv. 363, 366 (1965).
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diminish the retailer's stature.126 Indeed, it would tend to convert him
truly into a mere "conduit" or "way station," 27 which would be to bad.
12 6 See the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Standard Oil Co. of Cal.
v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949), where in different context he comments
eloquently on the loss to society should the stature of small business be reduced.
127 It was basically for these reasons that the writer opposed general inroads on the
independent contractor doctrine. Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2
U. Cm. L. REv. 501 (1935). The "inherent danger" in the contractor cases, however,
compares closely with "strict liability" in the product field.
I
